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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
After detailed examination of numerous technical, safety, 
and environmental issues, the Federal Ener gy Regulatory 
Commission ("FERC") issued a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity for plaintiff-appellant NE Hub 
Partners, L.P.'s ("NE Hub") natural gas storage facility (the 
"Facility") in Tioga County, Pennsylvania. The 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania may seek to revisit those 
issues in consolidated administrative appeals in its own 
permitting process in a costly pr oceeding that will delay NE 
Hub's construction of the Facility. Consequently, NE Hub 
brought a district court action seeking an injunction 
against the state appellate proceedings in an attempt to bar 
aspects of them on federal preemption gr ounds. The district 
court, however, rejected the claim without reaching its 
merits, principally on the jurisdictional gr ound that it was 
not ripe for decision before the state pr ocess concluded. See 
NE Hub Partners, L.P., No. 1: CA-99-0082 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 
2000) ("NE Hub"). We disagr ee with the district court on the 
ripeness issue and accordingly will reverse its order 
dismissing the action and will remand the case for further 
proceedings. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Factual History1 
 
Since 1995 NE Hub has been seeking a plethora of 
federal and state permits to construct the Facility. The 
construction is a substantial undertaking requiring NE Hub 
to drill through the Oriskany sand formation which 
contains competing storage facilities owned by Penn Fuel 
Gas, Inc. ("Penn Fuel") and CNG Transmission Corp. 
("CNGT").2 Not surprisingly Penn Fuel and CNGT have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We take the facts we recite mainly from the complaint which, for 
purposes of this appeal, should be taken as true and afforded all 
favorable inferences. See Standar d of Review, Part III, infra. 
2. CNGT now is called Dominion Transmission, Inc. and Penn Fuel now 
is called PPL Gas Utilities Corporation. As a matter of convenience we 
nevertheless continue to refer to them as CNGT and Penn Fuel. 
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opposed NE Hub every step of the way before both FERC 
and the Pennsylvania agencies exercising jurisdiction over 
the construction. 
 
Because the Facility will store natural gas for use in 
interstate commerce it is subject to FERC's jurisdiction and 
thus its construction requires a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity (the "Certificate") pursuant to 
section 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. SS 717 et seq. 
("NGA"). NE Hub applied for the Certificate in November 
1995, but Penn Fuel and CNGT intervened and r equested 
FERC to reject NE Hub's application on a variety of 
technical, safety and environmental grounds, including a 
claim that the construction and use of the Facility 
threatened to damage their own facilities. 
 
FERC reviewed the entire range of technical, safety, and 
environmental issues relating to the Facility, and, at the 
instance of Penn Fuel and CNGT, convened a technical 
conference on the application in September 1996 at which 
they raised the following 23 issues relating to the technical, 
safety, and environmental soundness of the Facility: 
 
       (1)  Whether NE Hub's Drilling and Construction 
       Program, utilizing a large diameter drill bit, would 
       result in massive mud loss to the Oriskany sand 
       formation; 
 
       (2)  Whether circulation materials would s atisfactorily 
       mitigate the mud loss into the surrounding 
       geological strata; 
 
       (3)  Whether test drilling perfor med on well TW-501 
       indicated that the Drilling and Construction 
       Program would lead to massive fluid loss to the 
       Oriskany sand formation; 
 
       (4)  Whether NE Hub's Drilling and Construction 
       Program had sufficient documentation r elating to 
       rates of penetration that could reasonably be 
       expected from the use of large diameter (28") 
       drilling bits to penetrate the Oriskany sand 
       formation; 
 
       (5)  Whether NE Hub's Drilling and Construction 
       Program had properly taken into account fracture 
       permeability of the Oriskany sand formation; 
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       (6)  Whether NE Hub's Drilling and Construction 
       Program had accounted for the pressur e 
       fluctuations it might encounter during drilling 
       operations due to existing gas storage facilities; 
 
       (7)  Whether NE Hub's Drilling and Construction 
       Program would result in cement invasion to the 
       Oriskany sand formation; 
 
       (8)  Whether mud loss and cement invasion cause d 
       by NE Hub's Drilling and Construction Program 
       would result in irremediable damage to the 
       deliverability of gas from the CNGT/Penn Fuel 
       Storage; 
 
       (9)  Whether NE Hub's Drilling and Construction 
       Program would lead to increased risk of gas leaks 
       and catastrophic blowouts; 
 
       (10) Whether the use of large quantities of loss 
       circulation materials in NE Hub's Drilling and 
       Construction Program would cause a `cake' to 
       form across the Oriskany sand for mation and 
       reduce the likelihood of achieving an adequate 
       cement bond between the wall of the well and the 
       casing string; 
 
       (11) Whether NE Hub's Drilling and Construction 
       Program would achieve the turbulent flow 
       required to remove loss circulation material from 
       the Oriskany sand formation and permit the 
       development of an adequate cement bond; 
 
       (12) Whether NE Hub's Drilling and Construction 
       Program required or contained sufficient 
       contingencies in the event an adequate cement 
       bond was not achieved; 
 
       (13) Whether NE Hub's Drilling and Construction 
       Program included procedures for the use of a 
       cement bond log tool to evaluate the integrity of 
       the cement bond between the well and casing 
       string; 
 
       (14) Whether NE Hub's Drilling and Construction 
       Program would lead to fracturing of the casing 
       shoe; 
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       (15) Whether NE Hub's Drilling and Construction 
       Program would lead to overpressuring of shallow 
       formations; 
 
       (16) Whether NE Hub's Drilling and Construction 
       Program would increase the likelihood of gas loss 
       or gas migration for the CNGT/Penn Fuel 
       Storage; 
 
       (17) Whether NE Hub's Drilling and Construction 
       Program would result in salt caver n subsidence; 
 
       (18) Whether NE Hub's Drilling and Construction 
       Program relied on proper resear ch and data 
       regarding the tensile and compressive strengths 
       for salt; 
 
       (19) Whether NE Hub's Drilling and Construction 
       Program relied on proper mechanical integrity 
       testing of the salt caverns; 
 
       (20) Whether NE Hub had failed to consider alter nate 
       sites for cavern development; 
 
       (21) Whether the Sandia National Laboratories r eport 
       used in development of the Drilling and 
       Construction Program adequately addressed 
       cavern operating pressures, caver n creep and 
       subsidence, and rock mechanics; 
 
       (22) Whether the geologic conditions at locations 
       targeted by NE Hub's Drilling and Construction 
       Program were adequate for cavern development; 
       and 
 
       (23) Whether NE Hub should be requir ed to obtain 
       insurance and/or indemnities that would be 
       available to compensate CNGT and/or Penn Fuel 
       for potential losses arising from the construction 
       or operation of the Facility. 
 
App. at 20-22. 
 
For the next year and a half FERC, in consultation with 
NE Hub, Penn Fuel, and CNGT and with the assistance of 
an outside consulting firm, exhaustively r eviewed NE Hub's 
proposal for the Facility, taking Penn Fuel's and CNGT's 
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objections into account. In connection with this r eview NE 
Hub, Penn Fuel, and CNGT led what NE Hub has 
characterized as "a parade of experts and technical 
consultants before F.E.R.C." See  app. at 24. FERC also 
made an Environmental Impact Assessment of the Facility 
pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act, treating 
at least seven issues: 
 
       (1) Requirements for NE Hub to create more than the 
       two salt caverns approved by the Certificate; 
 
       (2) Locations of structures and facilities necessary for 
       the Facility, including right-of-ways and the 
       freshwater intake structure; 
 
       (3) Whether the Facility could be constructed and 
       operated with insignificant effects on bodies of 
       water, including rivers and streams; 
 
       (4) Whether NE Hub's erosion and sedimentation 
       plans were sufficient to minimize impacts on soil 
       and bodies of water; 
 
       (5) Whether NE Hub's air pollution control plans were 
       sufficient to minimize air quality impacts, 
       including impacts from fugitive dust; 
 
       (6) Whether NE Hub's water quality management and 
       N.P.D.E.S. stormwater discharge plans were 
       sufficient to minimize impacts on water quality; 
       and 
 
       (7) Whether NE Hub's land use and reclamation plans 
       were adequate. 
 
See app. at 23. We call these seven issues along with the 23 
issues enumerated above the "30 Issues". In addition, 
FERC considered competitive and market issues. 
 
On April 20, 1998, FERC issued the Certificate in a 93- 
page order. See app. at 39 et seq. The order stated that 
FERC had exercised its jurisdiction over the Facility and 
found that it could be constructed and operated safely. See 
app. at 24. The order, however, imposed various conditions 
on the construction and operation of the Facility, and 
stated that "NE Hub must comply with the State of 
Pennsylvania's drilling regulations," app. at 101, and that 
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"[r]egulation of underground storage safety is at the state 
level." App. at 66. It also stated: 
 
       Any state or local permits issued with r espect to the 
       jurisdictional facilities authorized herein must be 
       consistent with the conditions of this certificate. The 
       Commission encourages cooperation between interstate 
       pipelines and local authorities. However, this does not 
       mean that state and local agencies, through 
       application of state or local laws, may prohibit or 
       unreasonably delay the construction or operation of 
       facilities[3] by this Commission.4 
 
App. at 109. 
 
Even before FERC issued its order NE Hub had applied 
to the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Protection ("Pa.D.E.P.") for the r equisite state permits and 
thus it was proceeding on parallel regulatory paths. See 
app. at 25. While Pa.D.E.P. had monitor ed the FERC 
proceedings, it chose not to seek to intervene in them as it 
could have under 15 U.S.C. S 717n(a) and 18 C.F.R. 
S 385.214(a)(2). See app. at 25. Penn Fuel and CNGT raised 
each of the 30 Issues in repeated appearances before 
Pa.D.E.P. but nevertheless on July 17, 1997, Pa.D.E.P. 
issued the permits NE Hub sought. See app. at 25-26. 
 
Over the next year Penn Fuel and CNGT filed thr ee 
appeals protesting issuance of the state per mits with the 
Environmental Hearing Board for the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania ("E.H.B."), which is authorized to hear such 
appeals. All the individual defendant-appellees r emaining in 
this action, i.e., all defendants except Penn Fuel and CNGT, 
are administrative law judges on the E.H.B., to whom we 
will refer collectively as E.H.B. In the appeals to E.H.B., 
which have since been consolidated, see app. at 26, Penn 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Presumably "authorized" or a wor d of similar meaning should appear 
here. 
 
4. The district court interpreted this language to mean that the 
Certificate "was conditioned on NE Hub's obtaining any and all 
necessary state or local permits requir ed to carry out the drilling and 
construction program." See NE Hub, slip op. at 5. The parties agree that 
this interpretation is correct. 
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Fuel and CNGT again raised each issue they had advanced 
before FERC, including the 30 Issues, and pr esented 
testimony and documentation they had presented to FERC. 
See app. at 27. E.H.B. has not decided the appeals but the 
Pa.D.E.P. permits are valid pending its decision. See app. at 
1021. 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
On January 15, 1999, NE Hub filed a complaint in the 
district court against Penn Fuel, CNGT, E.H.B. and James 
M. Seif, the Secretary of Pa.D.E.P., asking for a declaratory 
judgment that the NGA preempted the Pa.D.E.P . and E.H.B. 
review process. NE Hub also requested an order enjoining 
the E.H.B. proceedings and "such other r elief as this Court 
deems just and proper." See app. at 32. However, NE Hub 
in the district court and in this court pared the scope of its 
requested relief down to the 30 Issues, and renounced any 
claim that the Certificate completely bars state r egulation of 
the Facility in areas outside the 30 Issues. 5 The complaint 
also sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive r elief 
barring Penn Fuel and CNGT from relitigating the 30 Issues 
before Pa.D.E.P. and E.H.B. because in NE Hub's view this 
relitigation would amount to an appeal of the FERC order, 
which they could prosecute only pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 
S 717r(a). See app. at 32-33. 
 
Secretary Seif settled with NE Hub on June 30, 1999, 
stipulating that Pa.D.E.P. lacked authority to regulate the 
Facility with respect to the 30 Issues, and thus the district 
court dismissed him as a party on July 2, 1999. See NE 
Hub, slip op. at 9; app. at 842-59. All other defendants, i.e., 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. See, e.g., NE Hub's Resp. in Opp'n to CNG Transmission Corp.'s Mot. 
to Dismiss at app. at 490 ("[T]he Complaint does not seek a declaration 
that NE Hub is not required to comply to any extent with state 
environmental or safety requirements.. . . NE Hub instead seeks a 
declaration that state authorities may not r egulate or adjudicate the 
technical, safety or environmental issues that have already been decided 
by the federal agency with jurisdiction over such issues." (Emphasis 
added.)); NE Hub's Br. in Opp'n to the E.H.B. Defendants' Mot. to 
Dismiss at app. at 748; id. at 750-51; NE Hub's Br. in Opp'n to James 
M. Seif 's Mot. to Dismiss at app. at 731; id. at 734; NE Hub Appellant's 
Br. at 20 n.7. 
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the appellees here, moved to dismiss the complaint under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) on a variety of gr ounds, including 
ripeness, the Eleventh Amendment, abstention, and the 
Anti-Injunction Act. The parties agreed to stay the E.H.B. 
proceedings pending the outcome of this case. See NE Hub, 
slip op. at 8. 
 
The district court, in a Memorandum and Order dated 
April 7, 2000, granted the appellees' motions and dismissed 
NE Hub's complaint without prejudice. See id. at 21. The 
court parsed NE Hub's claim against E.H.B. into two 
theories of preemption: one claiming pr eemption only 
insofar as the state process conflicted with the Certificate, 
the other claiming a right to be completely fr ee from any 
state regulation. The court dismissed the action with 
respect to the conflict theory for lack of ripeness because 
E.H.B. had not yet taken an action that could inter fere with 
the federal regulations and the court believed that the 
requirement that NE Hub go through the state review 
process was not in itself a cognizable har m in the conflict 
preemption context. See id. at 15-18. The court dismissed 
the action with respect to the total exemption from 
regulation theory on the grounds that NE Hub's 
contentions challenged the terms of the Certificate 
requiring the obtaining of state permits and thus should 
have been presented to FERC for rehearing under 15 U.S.C. 
S 717r(a), which precludes judicial r eview of FERC orders 
prior to rehearing by FERC. See NE Hub, slip op. at 18-19. 
The court then found that its jurisdiction with r espect to 
NE Hub's claims against Penn Fuel and CNGT depended on 
its jurisdiction over the claims against E.H.B., and, as the 
latter was lacking, so was the former. See id. at 19-20. 
Accordingly, it dismissed the action in its entirety. 
 
NE Hub then timely filed this appeal contending that the 
district court erred in dismissing its pr eemption claim for 
lack of ripeness. See NE Hub's Br. at 3. NE Hub further 
contends that it is not challenging FERC's or der and thus 
it argues that the district court erred in holding that this 
action is barred because it has not sought r ehearing of the 
FERC order. 
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II. JURISDICTION 
 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal of afinal judgment 
of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291.6 The 
district court had federal question jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. SS 1331 and 1337, because the case ar ose under the 
Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the United States 
Constitution, and the NGA. 
 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Our review of a dismissal for lack of ripeness is plenary. 
See Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers v. Ridge, 150 F.3d 319, 
321 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Gould Elecs. v. United States, 
220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). Mor eover, when, as here, 
defendants move to dismiss a complaint under Rule 
12(b)(1) for failure to allege subject matter jurisdiction we 
treat the allegations of the complaint as true and afford the 
plaintiff the favorable inferences to be drawn from the 
complaint.7 See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8(f). 
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
A. Ripeness 
 
The Supreme Court stated the purpose and ef fect of the 
ripeness doctrine in the context of interfering with an 
administrative process in Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 
136, 148-49, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515 (1967): 
 
       [T]o prevent the courts, through avoidance of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We are not deprived of jurisdiction by reason of the dismissal having 
been without prejudice. See Black Horse Lane Assoc., L.P. v. Dow Chem. 
Corp., 228 F.3d 275, 282-87 (3d Cir . 2000). 
 
7. A challenge to a complaint for failure to allege subject matter 
jurisdiction is known as a "facial" challenge, and must not be confused 
with a "factual" challenge contending that the court in fact lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction, no matter what the complaint alleges, as factual 
challenges are subject to different standards. See Mortensen v. First Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977); 5A Wright & Miller, 
Federal Practice & Procedure S 1350, at 212-18 (West 1990). 
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       premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in 
       abstract disagreements over administrative policies, 
       and also to protect the agencies from judicial 
       interference until an administrative decision has been 
       formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the 
       challenging parties. 
 
In some circumstances the ripeness requir ement is drawn 
from Article III limitations on judicial power and in others 
from prudential limitations. See Suitum v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 733 n.7, 117 S.Ct 1659, 
1664 n.7 (1997); see also Ridge, 150 F .3d at 323 n.3 
(noting ambiguity over whether ripeness is a prudential 
limitation on federal jurisdiction or is requir ed by the case- 
or-controversy requirement of Article III of United States 
Constitution); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Obusek, 72 F.3d 1148, 
1154 (3d Cir. 1995) (same); Armstr ong World Indus., Inc. v. 
Adams, 961 F.2d 405, 411 n.12 (3d Cir . 1992) (same). 
Ripeness is a matter of degree whose thr eshold is 
notoriously hard to pinpoint. See, e.g., Maryland Cas. Co. v. 
Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273, 61 S.Ct. 510, 512 
(1941) ("The difference between an abstract question and a 
`controversy' contemplated by the Declaratory Judgment 
Act is necessarily one of degree, and it would be difficult, if 
it would be possible, to fashion a precise test. . . ."); 
McCahill v. Borough of Fox Chapel, 438 F .2d 213, 215 (3d 
Cir. 1971) ("The considerations, while catholic, are not 
concrete."); Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 912 
F.2d 643, 646 (3d Cir. 1990) ("it is difficult to define the 
contours of the ripeness doctrine with precision") (footnote 
omitted)). 
 
The Supreme Court in Abbott Labs laid out two 
fundamental considerations for determination of a ripeness 
question: (1) "the fitness of the issues for judicial decision," 
and (2) "the hardship to the parties of withholding court 
consideration."8 387 U.S. at 149, 87 S.Ct. at 1515. In the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Factors relevant to the "fitness" consideration include, but are not 
limited to, whether the issue is purely legal (as against factual), the 
degree to which the challenged action is final, whether the claim involves 
uncertain and contingent events that may not occur as anticipated or at 
all, the extent to which further factual development would aid decision, 
and whether the parties to the action are sufficiently adverse. The 
"hardship" consideration focuses on whether a plaintiff faces a direct 
and immediate dilemma, such that lack of review will put it to costly 
choices. See Ridge, 150 F.3d at 323. 
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context of declaratory judgments, we generally analyze 
ripeness under the threefold rubric of Step-Saver, 912 F.2d 
at 647, as did the district court here: first, the adversity of 
the parties' interests; second, the probable conclusiveness 
of a judgment; third, the practical utility to the parties of 
rendering a judgment.9 See Pic-A-State Pa, Inc. v. Reno, 76 
F.3d 1294, 1298 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
1. Adversity 
 
NE Hub claims that the state permit pr ocess with respect 
to the 30 Issues is preempted but that E.H.B. nevertheless 
will continue with that process unless enjoined. In these 
circumstances, NE Hub's and E.H.B.'s inter ests hardly 
could be more adverse. 
 
Nevertheless, the district court held NE Hub's inter ests 
insufficiently adverse to E.H.B.'s because: 
 
       In order to demonstrate that its claims ar e ripe, NE 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The Step-Saver rubric is a distillation of the factors most relevant to 
the Abbott Labs considerations. See Ridge, 150 F.3d at 323 n.4. 
Adversity and conclusiveness apparently ar e subsumed under the 
"fitness" prong of the Abbott Labs  test, while utility is relevant both 
to 
"fitness" and "hardship." Our cases have fit the factors relevant in the 
Abbott Labs framework into the Step-Saver  headings, as follows: 
 
ADVERSITY: 
 
- Whether the claim involves uncertain and contingent events, or 
presents a real and substantial threat of harm. See, e.g.,Presbytery of 
N.J. v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1466 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
CONCLUSIVENESS: 
 
- Whether issues are purely legal (as against factual). 
 
- Whether further factual development would be useful. 
 
See, e.g., id. at 1468; T ravelers Ins. Co., 72 F.3d at 1155. 
 
UTILITY: 
 
- Hardship to the parties of withholding decision. 
 
- Whether the claim involves uncertain and contingent events. 
 
See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. , 72 F.3d at 1155-56. 
 
Of course, there may be other factors consider ed in a ripeness analysis. 
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       Hub must show that the probability of the EHB 
       Defendants acting adversely to NE Hub is real and 
       substantial . . . . [T]he Environmental Hearing Board 
       Defendants have not, as yet, taken any action or 
       issued any decision potentially conflicting with the 7(c) 
       certificate. Further, it is entirely possible that the 
       Environmental Hearing Board will uphold the issuance 
       of the permits by [Pa.D.E.P.] and will never issue any 
       decision conflicting with the federal regulatory scheme. 
 
See NE Hub, slip op. at 15-16.10  This analysis, which 
focuses on the possible ultimate result of the state 
regulatory process, does not take into account the case law 
that preemption may operate to spare a party from that 
very process. In fact, the process itself may give rise to 
adversity so that an action challenging the pr ocess is ripe 
even before the process concludes. Thus, in Freehold 
Cogeneration Associates, L.P. v. Boar d of Regulatory 
Commissioners, 44 F.3d 1178 (3d Cir . 1995), we held that 
a preemption challenge to ongoing proceedings before the 
New Jersey Board of Regulatory Commissioners invading 
FERC's domain was ripe even though "the plaintif f did not 
challenge the ultimate substantive decision, but rather its 
authority to conduct proceedings": 
 
       [T]he issue here is ripe for adjudication. The 
       proceedings before the [state agency] have been 
       ongoing for nearly one year. The inter est that Freehold 
       seeks to vindicate in this proceeding is the right to be 
       free from `state laws . . . respecting the rates . . . of 
       electric utilities' and from the expense, delay, and 
       uncertainty inherent in the administration of such 
       laws. If, as Freehold insists, the ongoing[state agency] 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The district court also said NE Hub's claim was "based on the 
`possibility' that state regulatory officials might enter an order that 
would 
interfere with the regulatory scheme. Pl. Mem. Supp. Prelim. Inj. at 19. 
That `possibility' constitutes a contingency only, and is insufficient to 
constitute adversity of interests." See NE Hub, slip op. at 16. That 
statement mischaracterizes NE Hub's position which was that the 
process itself, at least as it related to the 30 Issues, interfered with 
the 
regulatory scheme. See, e.g. NE Hub's Br. in Opp'n to the E.H.B. 
Defendants' Mot. to Dismiss at app. at 749-51; NE Hub's Br. in Opp'n to 
James M. Seif 's Mot. to Dismiss at app. at 731, 734. 
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       proceedings constitute state regulation of utility rates 
       and the burdens on Freehold occasioned by those 
       proceedings are the kinds of burdens which Congress 
       intended [certain facilities] to be spar ed, Congress' 
       mandate would be frustrated if Freehold's right to 
       judicial review were postponed. Ther e is a concrete 
       dispute that has already worked a sever e hardship 
       upon Freehold, and a determination of the legal issue 
       of preemption need not await any further developments 
       . . . . 
 
Id. at 1189. 
 
In Sayles Hydro Associates v. Maughan, 985 F.2d 451, 
453-54, 456 (9th Cir. 1993), a Califor nia state water board 
withheld a hydroelectric plant permit because the applicant 
did not supply certain reports and studies. The court held 
that a claim that the Federal Power Act preempted the 
ongoing state permitting process by occupying the field of 
power projects regulation was ripe, explaining as follows: 
 
       The hardship is the process itself. Pr ocess costs 
       money. If a federal licensee must spend years 
       attempting to satisfy an elaborate, shifting array of 
       state procedural requirements, then he must borrow a 
       fortune to pay lawyers, economists, accountants, 
       archaeologists, historians, engineers, r ecreational 
       consultants, biologists, and others, with no r evenue, no 
       near-term prospect of revenue, and no certainty that 
       there ever will be revenue. Meanwhile, politics, laws, 
       interest rates, construction costs, and costs of 
       alternatives change. Undue process may impose cost 
       and uncertainty sufficient to thwart the federal 
       determination that a power project should proceed. 
 
Id. at 454. Similarly the court in Middle South Energy, Inc. 
v. Arkansas Public Service Commission, 772 F .2d 404 (8th 
Cir. 1985), found ripe a claim based on pr eemption and the 
Commerce Clause against ongoing Arkansas state agency 
proceedings determining whether to void certain interstate 
power purchase contracts claimed to be within FERC's sole 
jurisdiction. The plaintiff successfully 
 
       challenge[d] not the state's ultimate substantive 
       decision but its authority even to conduct the 
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       contemplated proceeding. It can hardly be doubted that 
       a controversy sufficiently concrete for judicial review 
       exists when the proceeding sought to be enjoined is 
       already in progress. 
 
Id. at 410-11. 
 
Courts have found insufficient adversity for ripeness 
where the chance of the defendant acting against plaintiff 
is but a "contingency." See, e.g. , Presbytery of N.J. v. Florio, 
40 F.3d 1454, 1464-68, 1470 (3d Cir. 1994) (insufficient 
adversity where state said it would not enfor ce challenged 
law against plaintiff); Armstrong World Indus., 961 F.2d at 
413-14 (insufficient adversity between state and plaintiffs 
challenging validity of takeover law, because takeover of 
plaintiffs was "contingency which may not occur," in which 
case they would not suffer from law). Her e, however, there 
is little doubt that E.H.B. will continue with the permit 
review process, and that the process itself is the alleged 
harm. 
 
We recognize that E.H.B. in its pr oceedings has not yet 
taken a position on whether it will reconsider the 30 Issues, 
and if so in what depth. Thus, arguably its interest is not 
substantively adverse to that of NE Hub. See Step-Saver, 
912 F.2d at 648. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the process 
creates the adversity and E.H.B. has not disclaimed a right 
to reexamine the issues we hold that its inter est is adverse 
to that of NE Hub. See Supplemental letter brief of E.H.B. 
at 4, Sept. 13, 2000 ("Because of the structur e and nature 
of its adjudicatory function, it is not possible for the EHB 
to determine what issues will be brought to its attention by 
CNGT and Penn Fuels in their challenge to NE Hub's 
permits."). At oral argument befor e us E.H.B. adhered to 
that position. 
 
2. Conclusiveness 
 
Conclusiveness is a short-hand term for whether a 
declaratory judgment definitively would decide the parties' 
rights. See Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 648. It also addresses 
the extent to which further factual development of the case 
would facilitate decision, so as to avoid issuing advisory 
opinions, or whether the question presented is 
predominantly legal. See Travelers Ins. Co., 72 F.3d at 
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1155. In this case, a declaratory judgment would establish 
that E.H.B. may or may not review and base its permit 
decision on a consideration of the 30 Issues, a conclusive 
result. 
 
Furthermore, additional factual development is 
unnecessary. We need not await the result of the E.H.B. 
process to ascertain whether a judgment will be conclusive 
because NE Hub's contention is that the process itself is 
preempted as to the 30 Issues regar dless of what the 
outcome of a proceeding before the E.H.B. would be as to 
those issues. Moreover, a determination of whether there is 
preemption primarily raises a legal issue, a circumstance 
which facilitates entry of a declaratory judgment. See 
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & 
Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 201, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1720-21 
(1983) ("The question of pre-emption is pr edominantly legal, 
and although it would be useful to have the benefit of [the 
state's interpretation and application of its r egulations], 
resolution of the pre-emption issue need not await that 
development."); Travelers Ins. Co., 72 F.3d at 1155 
(preemption is predominantly legal question conducive to 
declaratory judgment); Freehold Cogeneration Assocs., 44 
F.3d at 1188 (judgment would be conclusive because, inter 
alia, factual developments at ongoing state pr oceedings 
would not add to construction of allegedly pr eemptive 
federal statute); cf. Abbott Labs, 387 U.S. at 149, 87 S.Ct. 
at 1515 (issue ripe for decision because, inter alia, it is "a 
purely legal one"). 
 
The district court held that a judgment would be 
inconclusive because 
 
       without knowing whether Commonwealth will 
       ultimately deny project authority and on what ground, 
       it is impossible to determine whether its r equirements 
       burden or delay the NE Hub Project to such an extent 
       so as to be preempted by the 7(c) certificate. 
 
See NE Hub, slip op. at 16. Again, this statement overlooks 
that the state regulatory process itself can be the 
preempted burden. See discussion, infra, in part IV B of 
Freehold Cogeneration Assocs., Sayles Hydro Assocs., and 
Middle South; see also National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. 
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Public Service Comm'n, 894 F.2d 571, 578 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(finding state regulations of gas lines pr eempted for 
inconsistency with FERC permits because "[e]ven if a [gas] 
transporter were successful before the[state commission], 
the practical effect would be to under mine the F.E.R.C. 
approval by imposing the costs and delays inher ent in 
litigation that must be undertaken without any guidelines 
as to the limits on the exercise of state authority"); cf. 
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 201-02, 103 S.Ct. at 
1721 (preemption claim against moratorium on new 
nuclear power plants ripe because "to requir e the industry 
to proceed without knowing whether the moratorium is 
valid would impose a palpable and considerable har dship 
on the utilities, and may ultimately work har m on the 
citizens of California"). 
 
3. Practical Utility 
 
Practical utility goes to "whether the parties' plans of 
actions are likely to be affected by a declaratory judgment," 
Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 649 n.9, and considers the 
hardship to the parties of withholding judgment. See 
Freehold Cogeneration Assocs., 44 F .3d at 1189 (discussing 
hardship to preemption plaintiff of delay under utility prong 
of Step-Saver). A declaratory judgment "must be of some 
practical help to the parties. The Declaratory Judgments 
Act was enacted to clarify legal relationships so that 
plaintiffs (and possibly defendants) could make responsible 
decisions about the future." Travelers Ins. Co., 72 F.3d at 
1155 (quotation and citation omitted). 
 
A holding that the state proceedings ar e preempted 
obviously would be useful to NE Hub, which would be 
spared the hardships associated with the E.H.B. 
proceedings. NE Hub alleges that it is being put to 
considerable delay and expense by these proceedings in 
connection with the issues already dealt with by FERC.11 
See, e.g., app. at 981-82. As we stated above, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. This contention is undisputed, and is corr oborated by the statement 
of counsel for Penn Fuel at oral argument before the district court about 
the expenditures of his own client: "W e spent certainly in the seven 
figures, I would imagine, in litigating these permits before the E.H.B." 
See app. at 957. 
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requirement to go through a bur densome process can 
constitute hardship for purposes of ripeness. See, e.g., 
Freehold Cogeneration Assocs., 44 F .3d at 1188-89; Sayles 
Hydro Assocs., 985 F.2d at 453-56; National Fuel Gas, 894 
F.2d at 578-79; Middle South Ener gy, 772 F.2d at 410-411. 
Resolving the preemption question now also will eliminate 
the possibility that E.H.B. may overturn the Pa.D.E.P. 
permits on allegedly preempted gr ounds. Cf. Pacific Gas & 
Elec., 461 U.S. at 201-02, 103 S.Ct. at 1720-21 
(uncertainty entailed by existence of state pr ocedures part 
of harm cognizable in assessing ripeness of pr eemption 
claim); Sayles Hydro Assocs., 985 F .2d at 454 (same); but 
see Ridge, 150 F.3d at 323-26 (uncertainty as to way new 
procedures for determining pension levels would be applied 
insufficient hardship to ripen due pr ocess claim). 
 
The district court found that there was not a hardship 
because (1) the E.H.B. proceedings would not necessarily 
result in meaningless rehashing of issues, (2) additional 
process cannot constitute ripeness hardship, and (3) no 
state regulation presently stands in NE Hub's way. See NE 
Hub, slip op. at 17-18. 
 
The first proposition is correct but beside the point: there 
may be some issues that E.H.B. can consider outside of the 
30 Issues. Indeed, NE Hub asks that the proceedings before 
the E.H.B. be preempted only to the extent of precluding 
review of the 30 Issues. Thus, NE Hub does not suggest 
that federal preemption precludes E.H.B. from considering 
other issues.12 If the state pr ocess is preempted with 
respect to the 30 Issues, then undergoing the E.H.B. 
process with respect to those issues is a hardship 
cognizable for preemption purposes, and thus for 
determining ripeness of NE Hub's preemption claims. 
 
For the second proposition, the district court quoted two 
cases: 
 
       [T]he Court has not considered . . . litigation cost- 
       saving sufficient by itself to justify review in a case that 
       would otherwise be unripe. The ripeness doctrine 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. We understand that NE Hub expects that review of any other issues 
will be less burdensome than a review of the 30 Issues. 
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       reflects a judgment that the disadvantages of a 
       premature review that may prove too abstract or 
       unnecessary ordinarily outweigh the additional costs of 
       --even repetitive--post-implementation litigation. 
 
Ohio Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sierra Club , 118 S.Ct. 1665, 
1671 (1998). 
 
       [T]he burden of participating in further administrative 
       and judicial proceedings . . . do[es] not constitute 
       sufficient hardship for the purposes of ripeness. 
 
Florida Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 145 F.3d 1414, 1421 
(D.C. Cir. 1998). See NE Hub, slip op. at 17. But neither 
case involved a claim of preemption. When such a claim 
has been advanced, the need to participate in a state 
regulatory process in conflict with federal policy has been 
recognized as a hardship. See, e.g., Freehold Cogeneration 
Assocs., 44 F.3d at 1188-89; Sayles Hydro Assocs., 985 
F.2d at 453-56; National Fuel Gas, 894 F.2d at 578-79; 
Middle South Energy, 772 F.2d at 410-11; cf. First Iowa 
Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n , 328 U.S 
152, 66 S.Ct. 906 (1946) (hydroelectric plant project subject 
to jurisdiction of Federal Power Commission (FERC's 
predecessor) need not obtain permit fr om Iowa, despite law 
apparently conditioning federal license on compliance with 
state laws). Thus, while the district court's quotations are 
accurate they are not controlling pr ecedent in the 
circumstances here. 
 
Moreover, the extra litigation or administrative burden at 
issue in the cases quoted by the district court was 
apparently the burden of filing the same lawsuit later, not 
of undergoing an expensive and time-consuming state 
process. The cases quoted by the district court involved 
challenges to a Plan issued by the United States For est 
Service and a rule allegedly issued by the Envir onmental 
Protection Agency, respectively. See Sierra Club, 118 S.Ct. 
at 1668; Florida Power & Light, 145 F .3d at 1416. In both 
cases, how and even whether the Plan and rule would be 
applied was unclear; in Florida Power & Light , the court 
held the EPA had not even issued a rule. See Florida Power 
& Light, 145 F.3d at 1418-19. In Sierra Club, the Court 
stated that requiring a challenger to a rule to engage in 
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post-implementation litigation over the rule does not 
constitute sufficient hardship to ripen "a case that would 
otherwise be unripe." Sierra Club, 118 S.Ct. at 1671. 
Clearly, that holding is hardly controlling when the 
plaintiff 's challenge is to the conduct of an administrative 
process that imposes an ongoing burden. 
 
The district court's third proposition also misses the 
point that process can constitute hardship. While it is true 
that the Pa.D.E.P. permits are valid pending the E.H.B. 
outcome, it is not a regulation but the r egulatory process 
that afflicts NE Hub. If the process is pr eempted it is quite 
immaterial that the effectiveness of the per mits challenged 
has not been stayed. Moreover, if NE Hub goes forward 
construction of the Facility while the E.H.B. pr oceedings 
are pending it may find itself in a difficult situation if Penn 
Fuel and CNGT are successful before E.H.B. 
 
B. State regulatory process is susceptible of preemption 
by conflict or by field occupation. 
 
E.H.B. contends that the cases holding a state r egulatory 
process preempted have involved only field occupation 
preemption, and should be so confined and thus 
preemption principles are not applicable here as, in 
E.H.B.'s view, the NGA and FERC have not occupied the 
field. See E.H.B.'s br. at 17-23. The district court agreed 
that this case does not involve field occupation. We, 
however, strongly doubt that the district court was correct 
in this conclusion. See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 
485 U.S. 293, 295 n.1., 300-05, 108 S.Ct. 1145, 1148 n.1, 
1150-53 (1988); Sayles Hydro Assocs., 985 F.2d at 453; 
Pennsylvania Med. Soc'y v. Marconis, 942 F .2d 842, 847 (3d 
Cir. 1991); Public Utils. Comm'n v. FERC , 900 F.3d 269, 274 
(D.C. Cir. 1990). Nevertheless, we need not characterize 
definitively the type of preemption implicated here to 
determine ripeness, which is the only issue before us. To 
the extent the district court already tacitly has decided 
what type of preemption is involved, on r emand, if it 
reaches the issue, it should reconsider its decision.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The correct result here with r espect to preemption may be that we 
are dealing with a hybrid situation in which basically there is field 
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We realize that there would be a r easonable basis for a 
holding that process preemption should be applicable only 
when field preemption is implicated. The foundation for the 
holding would be that unless it is very clear that any result 
of a state permitting process either will be invalid or 
redundant a court should not stop the state fr om 
considering issues that in the absence of pr eemption would 
be within state jurisdiction and instead should trust in the 
judgment of the state officials not to inter fere unduly with 
a federal program. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
occupation but FERC, by requiring NE Hub to comply with state drilling 
regulations and indicating that regulation of underground storage safety 
is at the state level but providing that state and local authorities 
should 
not prohibit or unreasonably delay the construction or operation of the 
Facility, effectively has converted the case into a conflict preemption 
matter. In this regard we point out that even within an occupied field 
federal regulations may tolerate or authorize some exercises of state 
authority. See First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 167, 66 S.Ct. at 913; cf. National 
Fuel Gas, 894 F.2d at 579 (noting that though field of interstate gas 
facility regulation was occupied, FERC could choose to require licensees 
to obtain state permits). 
 
It is unclear why Judge Nygaard perceives himself as disagreeing with 
us on this point, for he believes (a) that field preemption applies here, 
but also (b) "FERC properly exercised its congressionally delegated 
authority by requiring compliance with state permitting procedures," 
dissent at 28, and (c) he acknowledges the Certificate's requirement that 
the results of those permitting pr ocedures "must be consistent with the 
conditions [thereof]." Thus, FERC has entire control over the occupied 
field (field occupation), but has allowed the state a regulatory role that 
it may exercise only insofar as it does not conflict with FERC's decisions 
(conflict preemption), which is precisely the hybrid sort of preemption by 
which the dissent purports to be "especially tr oubl[ed]." Id. at 28. 
 
Judge Nygaard also assigns to us a position that we nowhere take, 
namely, that the E.H.B. appeals conflict with federal law only because 
they "conflict with congressional intent to legislate exclusively." 
Dissent 
at 34 (emphasis in original). Quite the contrary, we recognize the 
possibility that Congress delegated authority to FERC, and that FERC, in 
turn has delegated some regulatory authority to the state, which the 
state may exercise only insofar as it does not conflict with the decisions 
already made by FERC. Thus, federal rules would not be exclusive 
because they would not be the only ones the NE Hub must obey, but 
some state regulations might still conflict with the federal regulations. 
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Nevertheless, the process preemption cases do not 
confine themselves to the field occupation context, nor 
would such a limitation be wise. Even where afield has not 
been occupied to the exclusion of state regulation, certain 
state regulatory acts clearly would conflict with federal law, 
and it is as logical to preempt state pr ocess concerning 
such matters as state actions in occupied fields. 14 Indeed, 
even if this is a conflict preemption case, it would be quite 
remarkable to hold that there cannot be pr ocess 
preemption here inasmuch as Secretary Seif on behalf of 
Pa.D.E.P. in settling the case recognized that, to the extent 
that FERC exercised jurisdiction, Pa.D.E.P . "[d]oes not have 
jurisdiction to consider and cannot conduct final 
appealable decisionmaking." App. at 855. This r ecognition 
broadly extended to "all construction activities related to 
the [Facility], including the drilling and construction of the 
brining facilities and the technical, safety, and 
environmental issues which were raised before and 
considered by FERC." App. at 846. While this stipulation 
may not be binding on the appellees, inasmuch as the state 
administrator himself recognizes the pr eemptive effect of 
the NGA and FERC's exercise of jurisdiction, we have good 
reason to recognize that conflict pr eemption principles 
might bar E.H.B. from upholding Penn Fuel's and CNGT's 
appeal on the 30 Issues. 
 
We also point out that, as the Supreme Court recently 
has emphasized, the different categories of preemption are 
not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Again, it is unclear why Judge Nygaar d perceives himself as 
disagreeing with us on this point for he "can possibly envision conflict 
preemption barring an on-going legal pr oceeding . . . in which the 
outcome sought by the party opposing preemption is almost certain to 
conflict with federal law." Dissent at 35. That is exactly what we hold. 
He 
then says that that is not the case here, because the E.H.B. might 
"impose additional requirements on NE Hub that do not conflict with the 
7(c) certificate." Id. That is unquestionably true but irrelevant because 
NE Hub does not seek preemption of the entir e state process, only of the 
process with respect to the 30 Issues. W e do not decide whether the 
outcome of the E.H.B. proceedings with r espect to the 30 Issues would 
clearly so conflict. That is for the district court to decide on remand. 
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       rigidly distinct. Indeed, field pre-emption may be 
       understood as a species of conflict pre-emption: A state 
       law that falls within a pre-empted field conflicts with 
       Congress' intent (either express or plainly implied) to 
       exclude state regulation. 
 
English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5, 110 S.Ct. 
2270, 2275 n.5 (1990); see also Crosby v. National Foreign 
Trade Council, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 2294 n.6 (2000); Gade, 505 
U.S. at 98, 104 n.2, 112 S.Ct. at 2383, 2386 n.2 (1992) 
(plurality opinion) ("Our ultimate task in any pre-emption 
case is to determine whether state regulation is consistent 
with the structure and purpose of the statute as a whole." 
(Emphasis added.)); Sayles Hydro Assocs. , 985 F.2d at 456 
("The dichotomy between the two types of pr eemption 
[conflict and field] is not so sharp in practical terms as the 
legal categorization makes it appear . . . ."). 
 
A comparison of the standards for identifying these two 
types of preemption15 shows the reason for the blurring.16 
Conflict preemption exists where state law stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress. See e.g., Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404 (1941). An 
occupied field is one in which the federal r egulatory scheme 
is "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that 
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it." Rice 
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 
1146, 1152 (1947). That inference is reasonable where any 
state regulation of the "occupied" subject matter would 
interfere with the purposes and objectives of the federal 
plan: a very similar standard to that for conflict 
preemption. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 
151, 168, 98 S.Ct. 988, 999 (1978) (finding field preemption 
of vessel regulations because "a state law in this area . . . 
would frustrate the Congressional desir e . . ."). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. We are not concerned here with express preemption which is another 
type of preemption. 
 
16. Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, at 31, by no means do we 
obliterate the distinction between the types of pr eemption, and we 
recognize the continuing existence of each. W e simply note that an 
instance of preemption need not necessarily be pigeonholed into one 
category or another for purposes of analyzing ripeness. 
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We therefore hold that state r egulatory process may be 
preempted by conflict with federal law,17 as well as by field 
occupation. Moreover, we reiterate that we are quite unable 
to understand why, regardless of the type of preemption 
asserted, that a claim that a state administrative process is 
preempted necessarily cannot be ripe when the alleged 
preemption is of the process itself rather than the possible 
outcome of the process. We also note that it would be 
entirely logical in an appropriate case to hold that the 
process is not preempted but to hold later that the result of 
the process is preempted. 
 
Furthermore, if it is evident that the r esult of a process 
must lead to conflict preemption, it would defy logic to hold 
that the process itself cannot be preempted and that a 
complaint seeking that result would not raise a ripe issue. 
Thus, in view of the substantial showing her e that E.H.B. 
by upholding Penn Fuel's and CNGT's position on the 30 
Issues might well reach a result that would be preempted, 
the process preemption claim is ripe. Of course, we hasten 
to add that we do not state a conclusion on whether the 
process actually is preempted here for, as even NE Hub 
recognizes, the district court should make that decision on 
the remand. See Presbytery of N.J. , 40 F.3d at 1470.18 
 
C. The need for FERC rehearing 
 
Finally we reject the district court's and appellees' view 
that NE Hub by bringing this action was circumventing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Federal law includes federal regulations, which have no less 
preemptive effect than federal statutes. See e.g., Capital Cities Cable, 
Inc. 
v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699, 104 S.Ct. 2694, 2700 (1984). 
 
18. Our opinion should not be overread. W e are not holding that any 
claim of process preemption necessarily is ripe so that the court should 
consider the preemption claim before the process is completed. It well 
may be that in a particular case when conflict pr eemption is implicated 
the court may conclude that it reasonably can be anticipated that the 
process will yield a result that is not pr eempted. But in this case we 
have an unusual situation in which the state administrator has 
stipulated the agency's jurisdiction effectively has been preempted, a 
result which, though not binding on the appellees, if accepted would 
mean that a successful administrative appeal would lead to a preempted 
outcome. 
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FERC's rehearing process. In the first place, the district 
court reached that conclusion on the err oneous theory that 
NE Hub was contending "that Pennsylvania lacks authority 
to subject the NE Hub Project to any regulation 
whatsoever." NE Hub, slip op. at 18. In fact, NE Hub does 
not challenge FERC's requirement that it obtain state 
permits and cooperate with state and local agencies. 
Indeed, it has done these things. It simply contends that 
the E.H.B. state proceedings are pr eempted but only to the 
extent that they involve the 30 Issues consider ed by FERC. 
We see nothing in the Certificate or the NGA that precludes 
NE Hub's preemption argument and it ther efore follows that 
in making that argument NE Hub is not challenging the 
terms of the Certificate. Furthermor e, we do not believe 
that a requirement that a party obtain applicable state 
permits and cooperate with state and local agencies in any 
way determines the scope of what issues a state 
administrative agency may consider on an appeal fr om the 
issuance of the permits.19 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons we will r everse the order of 
April 7, 2000, dismissing this action and will r emand the 
case to the district court to reinstate this action. On the 
remand the district court should consider the preemption 
argument on the merits unless it upholds another defense 
to this action. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. The dissent characterizes NE Hub's claim as a challenge to the terms 
of the Certificate because the E.H.B. proceeding is one "that FERC 
implicitly sanctioned." Dissent at 40. But the dissent does not explain 
where in the Certificate FERC "implicitly sanctioned" a state proceeding 
insofar as it deals with measures already disposed of by FERC. 
 
Judge Nygaard states that he and we "disagr ee over who should 
determine whether the state actions at issue were `consistent' with 
FERC's certificate. The Majority believes that FERC delegated that 
authority to the federal courts. I believe that FERC maintained its 
discretion." Dissent 32 n.5. Federal agencies do not "delegate" authority 
to decide federal constitutional and legal questions to courts; as noted 
above, at 37, federal court jurisdiction over such matters comes from 
Congress. We are aware of no authority granting FERC a right of first 
refusal to decide such questions, nor does Judge Nygaard proffer any. 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, dissenting : 
 
I would affirm the District Court's disposition of N.E. 
Hub's field preemption claim. Therefor e, I dissent. Central 
to the Majority's holding is its assertion that"we need not 
characterize definitively the type of preemption implicated 
here." Majority at 21. I believe that characterizing N.E. 
Hub's claim is the first and most important issue in this 
case. By failing to resolve it, the Majority ignores binding 
Supreme Court precedent and unnecessarily complicates a 
well-settled area of law. Especially tr oubling are its 
proposal of a new class of "hybrid" pr eemption, and its 
reference to a mysterious "process" preemption. 
 
Congress intended to occupy the field of law at issue. 
Therefore, the disputed appeals ar e subject to federal field 
preemption. Nonetheless, I would affir m the District Court's 
decision, because FERC properly exercised its 
congressionally delegated authority by r equiring compliance 
with state permitting procedures. More importantly, even if 
FERC overstepped its bounds, the proper course for N.E. 
Hub would have been to challenge FERC directly under the 
guidelines established by federal statute. Because N.E. Hub 
failed to do so, I agree with the District Court that we lack 
jurisdiction to consider the current claim. 
 
I. 
 
A brief review of the law of preemption is instructive. 
Assuming it has the constitutional power to legislate in a 
given area, Congress can preempt state law whenever it 
intends federal law to control. See Fr eehold Cogeneration 
Assocs., L.P. v. Board of Regulatory Comm'rs of State of New 
Jersey, 44 F.3d 1178, 1190 (3d Cir . 1995) ("[T]he 
application of the preemption doctrine r equires a 
determination of congressional intent in enacting a federal 
law."). The key inquiry is congressional intent, which can 
either be explicit or implied. When it is implied, intent can 
take one of two forms. First, "[i]f Congress evidences an 
intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling within 
that field is preempted." Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 
U.S. 238, 248, 104 S.Ct. 615, 621 (1984). Congr essional 
intent to occupy a field can be inferred fr om: 
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       a `scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make 
       reasonable the inference that Congr ess left no room to 
       supplement it,' `because the Act of Congr ess may touch 
       a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that 
       the federal system will be assumed to preclude 
       enforcement of state laws on the same subject,' or 
       because `the object sought to be obtained by the federal 
       law and the character of obligations imposed by it may 
       reveal the same purpose.' 
 
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & 
Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1722 
(1983). Second, if Congress has not occupied an entire 
field, "state law is still preempted to the extent it actually 
conflicts with federal law, that is, when it is impossible to 
comply with both state and federal law." Id.  
 
In sum, there are three circumstances under which 
federal law preempts state law: (1) when Congr ess, through 
explicit statutory language, defines an ar ea in which federal 
law controls, (2) when Congress implicitly indicates an 
intent to occupy a given field to the exclusion of state law, 
and (3) when federal law actually conflicts with state law. 
See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 
S.Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992); Buzzard v. Roadrunner Trucking, 
Inc., 966 F.2d 777, 780 (3d Cir. 1992). We have consistently 
analyzed preemption claims according to this framework. 
See Abdullah v. American Airlines, 181 F .3d 363, 367 (3d 
Cir. 1999). 
 
II. 
 
Next, I turn to N.E. Hub's specific claim. In Schneidewind 
v. ANR Pipeline Co., the Supreme Court held that Congress 
intended to occupy the field at issue.1  See 485 U.S. 293, 
308, 108 S.Ct. 1145, 1155 (1988) ("[T]he control of rates 
and facilities of natural gas companies . . . ar e precisely the 
things over which FERC has comprehensive authority."). 
The Court noted that it "is now well settled[that] Congress 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Because Congress failed to describe explicitly the extent to which the 
NGA preempts state regulation of natural gas facilities, the first of the 
aforementioned circumstances (expr ess preemption) does not apply. 
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occupied the field of matters relating to wholesale sales and 
transportation of natural gas in interstate commer ce." Id. at 
305, 108 S.Ct. at 1153. An overwhelming amount of 
authority supports this assertion.2 Even in Maritimes & 
Northeast Pipeline, L.L.C., No. CP97-238-001, 1997 WL 
812154, at *8 (F.E.R.C. Nov. 4, 1997), the case most heavily 
relied upon by CNGT and Penn Fuel, FERC noted that "the 
NGA preempts State and local agencies fr om regulating the 
construction and operation of interstate pipeline facilities." 
It is simply beyond peradventure that Congr ess intended 
the NGA to occupy the field of law at issue. 
 
Both the Majority and the District Court disagr ee and 
hold that field preemption does not apply. The District 
Court expressly rejected field pr eemption, but nonetheless 
addressed and rejected the claim on its merits. The 
Majority purports to avoid categorizing the claim, but still 
implicitly endorses conflict preemption. I believe that field 
preemption does apply, but I agree with the District Court 
that the claim fails on its merits. This is an important 
question. If field preemption applies but FERC validly 
exercised its authority, we should affir m the District 
Court's decision and not remand the case. Fundamentally, 
the resolution of this question -- whetherfield preemption 
applies -- controls whether this case is r emanded or 
affirmed. I therefore review the opinions of the Majority and 
District Court in turn. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See e.g., Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 331 U.S. 
682, 690, 67 S.Ct. 1482, 1487 (1947) ("As was stated in the House 
Committee Report, the `basic purpose' of Congr ess in passing the Natural 
Gas Act was "to occupy this field in which the Supreme Court has held 
that the States may not act."); Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y v. Marconis, 
942 F.2d 842, 847 (3d Cir. 1991) ("The field of matters relating to 
wholesale sales and transport of natural gas in interstate commerce 
[has] been occupied by federal legislation."); Public Utils. Comm'n of 
State 
of California v. FERC, 900 F.2d 269, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("Cases are 
legion affirming the exclusive character of FERC jurisdiction where it 
applies . . . under the NGA."); Algonquin LNG v. Loqa, 79 F.Supp.2d 49, 
51 (D.R.I. 2000) ("Congress clearly has manifested an intent to occupy 
the field."). 
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A. 
 
The Majority at first seems to agree with me that field 
preemption should apply. It states that "[t]he district court 
[held] that this case does not involve field occupation. We, 
however, strongly doubt that the district court was correct." 
Majority at 21 (emphasis added). The Majority fails to apply 
field preemption, however, and instead holds that "we need 
not characterize definitively the type of pr eemption 
implicated here to determine ripeness." Majority at 21. In 
spite of this, I believe that the Majority tacitly does 
characterize N.E. Hub's claim. It rejects field preemption 
and endorses conflict preemption, even though its 
reasoning assumes that Congress has occupied the field. 
 
The District Court's decision requires us to categorize the 
claim in this case, because it addressed N.E. Hub's two 
preemption "theories" and reached different outcomes for 
each. The court held that conflict preemption was not ripe, 
but rejected field preemption on separate grounds.3 The 
Majority states that ripeness "is the only issue before us." 
Majority at 21. The District Court discussed ripeness only 
in connection to conflict preemption. Ther efore, the 
Majority's opinion, to the extent that it exclusively focuses 
on ripeness, holds that only conflict preemption is at issue. 
 
Furthermore, because courts need only address conflict 
preemption in the absence of field pr eemption, see 
Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248, 104 S.Ct. at 621 ("If Congress 
has not entirely displaced state regulation over the matter 
in question, state law is still preempted to the extent it 
actually conflicts with federal law."), the Majority's focus on 
ripeness tacitly rejects field preemption. If field preemption 
applied, there would be no reason to analyze the ripeness 
of the conflict preemption claim.4  In fact, the Majority 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The District Court explicitly addressed the field preemption claim, "NE 
Hub's alternative theory, that Pennsylvania lacks authority to subject the 
NE Hub Project to any regulation whatsoever." MemOp. at 18. The court 
characterized the claim as a direct "challenge to the express provisions 
of [FERC's] 7(c) certificate," and found that it lacked jurisdiction 
because 
N.E. Hub should have appealed directly to FERC. MemOp. at 18. 
4. The Majority argues that we need not categorize the preemption claim 
in order to analyze its ripeness. However , the District Court only found 
ripeness lacking in the conflict preemption claim; therefore, we need not 
address ripeness unless the claim is one of conflict preemption. 
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explicitly holds that N.E. Hub never raised a field 
preemption claim. See Majority at 26. Thus, even though it 
"strongly doubt[s] that the district court was correct [to 
reject field preemption]," Majority at 21, the Majority rejects 
it as well. 
 
Instead, the Majority suggests that we have a "hybrid 
situation" in which "there is field occupation but FERC . . . 
has converted the case into a conflict preemption matter." 
Majority at 21-22 n.13. I disagree with this characterization 
for two reasons. First, neither law nor logic suggests the 
existence of such a thing, and second, for r easons I explain 
more fully in Section II.B., supra, FERC does not have the 
authority to abdicate its congressionally delegated authority.5 
In addition, I fail to see how this "hybrid" differs practically 
from pure conflict preemption considering that FERC "has 
converted the case into a conflict pr eemption matter." 
Majority at 21-22 n.13 (emphasis added). If a "hybrid" 
preemption claim carries with it a differ ent standard, the 
Majority does not describe what it might be. For these 
reasons, I believe that the Majority, in spite of its language 
to the contrary, tacitly did categorize N.E. Hub's claim as 
conflict preemption, and the District Court must apply that 
doctrine upon remand. 
 
The Majority offers two additional arguments to support 
its position: (1) field and conflict preemption overlap and 
are difficult to distinguish, and (2) the existence of a legal 
process can form the basis of a field or conflict preemption 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       5. The Majority believes that FERC delegated its occupation of the 
       field, at least in part, to the states. Ther efore, any "conflicts" 
that 
       arose could form the basis of a conflict preemption claim in 
federal 
       court. The important difference between us is that I believe FERC 
       continued to maintain its ultimate authority. Because it continued 
       to occupy the field, it maintained its discr etion to interpret the 
       terms of its 7(c) certificate. If an alleged"conflict" arose, it 
was up 
       to FERC to determine if the certificate had been violated. Our 
review 
       of such a decision would be the same as our r eview of any other 
       action by an administrative agency in an occupiedfield. In sum, the 
       Majority and I disagree over who should deter mine whether the 
       state actions at issue were "consistent" with FERC's certificate. 
The 
       Majority believes that FERC delegated that authority to the federal 
       courts. I believe that FERC maintained its discr etion. 
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claim. See Majority at 24-25. When r eviewed carefully, 
neither support the Majority's holding; in fact, both 
ironically assume that Congress has pr eempted the field. 
 
First, the Majority argues that it need not characterize 
N.E. Hub's claim, because field and conflict pr eemption are 
not "rigidly distinct," see English v. General Elec. Co., 496 
U.S. 72, 79 n.5, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 2275 n.5 (1990), 6 
implying, based upon its definitions, that field and conflict 
preemption are indistinguishable. T echnically, all forms of 
federal preemption can be described as (and meet the 
definition of) conflict preemption,7 for the simple reason 
that preemption only occurs when a state action conflicts 
with congressional intent.8 In spite of its extremely broad 
definition, however, conflict preemption does not refer to the 
entire range of all federal preemption. Instead, courts use 
the term quite narrowly -- it applies when a state 
regulation conflicts with federal law in a non-occupied field.9 
See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248, 104 S.Ct. at 621 ("If 
Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over 
the matter in question, state law is still pr eempted to the 
extent it actually conflicts with federal law."). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The Supreme Court footnote from which the Majority derives its 
argument nonetheless explicitly upheld the thr ee categories of 
preemption. See English, 496 U.S. at 79 n.5, 110 S.Ct. at 2275 n.5 
("[B]ecause we previously have adverted to the three-category framework, 
we invoke and apply it here."). 
 
7. According to its broad definition, conflict preemption applies whenever 
a state regulation "actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when it 
is 
impossible to comply with both state and federal law, or where the state 
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress." See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248, 104 S.Ct. at 
621 (citations omitted); see also e.g., English, 496 U.S. at 79, 110 S.Ct. 
at 2275 (citations omitted). 
 
8. Courts have identified, and labeled, thr ee forms of federal preemption 
(express, field, and conflict preemption) that vary according to their 
scope. According to the Supreme Court,"[f]requently, the preemptive 
`label' we choose will carry with it substantive implications for the 
scope 
of preemption." Gade v. National Solid W aste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 
104 n.2, 112 S.Ct. 2374, 2386 n.2 (1992). 
 
9. Conflict preemption in an occupiedfield would be unnecessary and 
duplicative, because all state regulation is barred by field preemption. 
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The Majority fails to make this distinction. It compares 
the definitions of conflict and field preemption and argues 
that field preemption is simply a presumption of conflict 
preemption over an entire area of law.10 Because all three 
categories of federal preemption technically fall within the 
definition of conflict preemption, any state regulation (or 
judicial proceeding, as in this case) subject to field 
preemption would also be barred under the technical 
definition of conflict preemption. See English, 496 U.S. at 
79, 110 S.Ct. at 2275 (defining conflict pr eemption, in part, 
to apply when "state law `stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress' "). 
 
However -- and this is the critical point -- in this case, 
the only reason that the challenged state actions (the 
appeals) satisfy the definition of conflict pr eemption is 
because Congress has preempted thefield. The Majority 
never asserts that the appeals at issue make it"impossible 
to comply with both state and federal law," but merely that 
they frustrate congressional intent to legislate exclusively in 
this area. In other words, as the Majority phrases it, 
conflict preemption holds because the state proceedings 
"interfere with the purposes and objectives of the federal 
plan." Majority at 24. The "federal plan," I suppose, refers 
to Congress' intent to occupy the field at issue. Thus, the 
Majority's argument, when closely scrutinized, goes 
something like this: (1) Congress preempted the field, and 
(2) the appeals at issue constitute state action within that 
field; therefore, (3) the appeals conflict with congressional 
intent to legislate exclusively. The Majority's r easoning 
implicitly recognizes that Congress intended to occupy the 
field at issue. As such, I would affix the pr oper "label" to 
N.E. Hub's preemption claim. When a state law"conflicts" 
with "the purposes and objectives" of Congr ess to occupy a 
given field, courts label it field, notconflict, preemption.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. See e.g., English, 496 U.S. at 79 n.5, 110 S.Ct. at 2275 n.5 ("[F]ield 
preemption may be understood as a species of conflict preemption: A 
state law that falls within a preempted field conflicts with Congress' 
intent (either express or plainly implied) to exclude state regulation."). 
 
11. In a footnote, the Majority claims that "by no means do we mean to 
obliterate the distinction between the types of pr eemption, and we 
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The Majority's second argument further underscores its 
implicit recognition that Congress has pr eempted the field.12 
The Majority argues that it need not classify the claim at 
issue, because either field or conflict pr eemption can bar a 
legal process such as the appeals in this case.13 See 
Majority at 23 ("[T]he process pr eemption cases do not 
confine themselves to the field occupation context."). The 
Majority cites no case in which any court has held that 
conflict preemption bars an unfinished legal process with 
an indeterminate outcome. I too was unable tofind such a 
case.14 
 
The only scenario in which I can possibly envision 
conflict preemption barring an on-going legal proceeding is 
one in which the outcome sought by the party opposing 
preemption is certain to conflict with federal law. In other 
words, for conflict preemption to apply, the relief sought by 
CNGT and Penn Fuel would have to conflict totally with 
FERC's 7(c) certificate. This is not the case. It is entirely 
possible that the Environmental Hearing Boar d could, as a 
result of the appeals at issue, impose additional 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
recognize the continuing existence of each." Majority at 24 n.16. 
However, if we need not classify the pr eemption claim in this case, in 
spite of Supreme Court precedent explicitly holding that Congress has 
occupied the field, I fail to see how the distinction retains any force. 
 
12. For the remainder of this dissent, I r efer to conflict preemption in 
the 
manner that courts apply it (in a non-occupied field) rather than 
according to its sweeping definition, which encompasses all forms of 
federal preemption. 
 
13. I assume that when the Majority uses the ter m "process preemption," 
it is referring to a federal preemption claim based upon an ongoing legal 
process. Unlike conflict or field preemption, "process preemption" is not 
a term of art; in fact, a Westlaw search revealed that no federal court 
has 
ever used the term. 
 
14. The Majority relies upon two unsupported assertions: (1) its own 
belief that "certain regulatory acts clearly would conflict with federal 
law, 
and it is as logical to preempt state pr ocess concerning such matters as 
state actions in occupied fields," and (2) a statement by the 
administrator of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Protection that the agency lacked jurisdiction to "conduct final 
appealability decisionmaking" in this matter . Majority at 23. 
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requirements on N.E. Hub that would not conflict with the 
7(c) certificate.15 
 
In sum, the Majority purports to avoid categorizing N.E. 
Hub's claim. In reality, however, it r ejects field preemption 
and requires the District Court to apply conflict preemption 
upon remand, even though its reasoning assumes that 
Congress has occupied the field. Accor ding to the Supreme 
Court, conflict preemption should be applied only if 
"Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over 
the matter in question" explicitly or thr ough implied field 
preemption. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248, 104 S.Ct. at 621. In 
this case, the overwhelming weight of Supreme Court 
precedent indicates that Congress intended the NGA to 
occupy the field at issue. As a result, I disagree with the 
Majority's approach and would instead applyfield 
preemption. 
 
B. 
 
The District Court addressed the classification issue 
explicitly. It held that field preemption does not apply, 
because FERC had affirmatively limited its own jurisdiction. 
It noted that "[a]lthough the Natural Gas Act might be read 
to completely preempt any state regulation of the transport, 
storage and sale of natural gas in interstate commer ce, 
FERC has interpreted its jurisdiction under the Natural Gas 
Act to allow for some state regulation." MemOp. at 13. In 
effect, the District Court held that FERC r efused to occupy 
the given field and instead partially delegated its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. The Majority states that conflict pr eemption bars "the process with 
respect to the 30 Issues," because its outcome is "almost certain to 
conflict with federal law." Majority at 23 n.14. In practice, I seriously 
doubt that a court could effectively isolate state proceedings likely to 
lead to conflicting outcomes from those that could possibly lead to 
"additional requirements . . . that donot conflict with the 7(c) 
certificate." 
Majority at 23 n.14. Forcing courts to do so would in effect require them 
to predict the outcomes of unfinished legal proceedings in separate 
jurisdictions. I suspect that this difficulty explains why courts have 
widely refused to apply conflict preemption to bar an ongoing state 
process, and have instead relied uponfield preemption when it is 
appropriate. 
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responsibilities to the states. The Majority seems to endorse 
this conclusion hesitantly in a footnote, ter ming this case a 
"hybrid" situation. See Majority at 21 n.13. 
 
The District Court's analysis, and the Majority's r eference 
to it, is flawed. Admittedly, Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 
842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82 (1984), often r equires 
courts to defer to an agency's statutory interpr etation, and 
we have held that Chevron defer ence extends to an agency's 
interpretation of its own jurisdiction. See Puerto Rico Mar. 
Shipping Auth. v. Valley Freight Sys., Inc., 856 F.2d 546, 
552 (3d Cir. 1988) ("This rule of defer ence is fully applicable 
to an agency's interpretation of its own jurisdiction."). 
However, courts need only defer to an agency when the 
intent of Congress is unclear. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842- 
43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-82 ("If the intent of Congr ess is clear, 
that is the end of the matter.").16 Here, as previously 
discussed, the intent of Congress to occupy the entire field 
is, and has been for decades, clearly established by the 
Supreme Court. As a result, FERC could not limit its 
jurisdiction in the face of contrary, clear congr essional 
intent. See id. at 843 n.9, 104 S.Ct. at 2781 n.9 ("The 
judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory 
construction and must reject administrative constructions 
which are contrary to clear congressional intent."). 
 
Furthermore, based upon my reading of Maritimes, FERC 
did not intend to restrict its jurisdiction. See 1997 WL 
812154, at *8. Quite the contrary - it exer cised its wide- 
ranging jurisdiction in order to requir e that natural gas 
companies comply with state regulations as a condition to 
granting a 7(c) certificate. After reaffir ming the NGA's 
preemption of state and local regulation, FERC stated that 
"as a matter of policy, . . . the Commission has imposed 
upon applicants a requirement that they cooperate with 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. See also Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295, 116 S.Ct. 763, 769 
(1996) ("Absent . . . compelling evidence bearing on Congress' original 
intent, our system demands that we adhere to our prior interpretations 
of statutes."); Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 
U.S. 
116, 131, 110 S.Ct. 2759, 2768 (1990) ("Once we have determined a 
statute's clear meaning, we adhere to that determination under the 
doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency's later interpretation 
of 
the statute against our prior determination of the statute's meaning."). 
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State and local authorities." Id. (emphasis added). FERC did 
not limit its own jurisdiction, but rather used its authority 
to implement a policy objective. If it had, in fact, abdicated 
its jurisdiction, it would have been unable to impose state 
regulations upon anyone. 
 
It is undisputed by both the Majority and the District 
Court that Congress intended federal law to occupy the 
entire field at issue. Because neither FERC nor this Court 
have the discretion to contravene clear congr essional 
intent, field preemption should apply. The ripeness of N.E. 
Hub's conflict preemption claim is ther efore irrelevant. 
 
III. 
 
Finally, I address the merits of N.E. Hub'sfield 
preemption claim. First of all, it is clearly ripe. We require 
that a claim satisfy three elements in or der to be ripe for 
decision: "adversity of the interests of the parties, 
conclusiveness of the judicial judgment and the practical 
help, or utility, of that judgment." Step-Saver Data Systems, 
Inc. v. WYSE Technology, 912 F.2d 643, 647 (3d Cir. 1990). 
All three are satisfied. The state pr oceedings themselves 
constitute an injury establishing adversity of inter est. See 
Sayles Hydro Assocs. v. Maughan, 985 F .2d 451, 454 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (holding that in the field preemption context, 
"[t]he hardship is the process itself.").17 A decree indicating 
that FERC's 7(c) certificate preempted all state regulation of 
N.E. Hub's project would be "conclusive" under any 
definition of the term, see Step-Saver , 912 F.2d at 648, and 
it would be "useful," because it would allow N.E. Hub to 
proceed with its project. See id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. See also Freehold, 44 F.3d at 1189 (holding that a field preemption 
claim was ripe because "the plaintiff did not challenge the state's 
ultimate substantive decision, but rather its authority to conduct 
proceedings."); Middle South Ener gy, Inc. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 
772 F.2d 404, 410-11 (8th Cir. 1985) (claim ripe where the plaintiff 
"challenges not the state's ultimate substantive decision but its 
authority 
to even conduct the contemplated proceeding. It can hardly be doubted 
that a controversy sufficiently concr ete for judicial review exists when 
the proceeding sought to be enjoined is alr eady in progress."). 
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Apparently, the District Court agreed that if field 
preemption applied, N.E. Hub's claim was ripe. After a 
lengthy and unnecessary discussion of the ripeness of the 
conflict preemption claim, it moved immediately to the 
merits of the field preemption claim (without discussing its 
ripeness). The court held that the claim failed on its merits: 
 
       NE Hub's alternative theory, that Pennsylvania lacks 
       authority to subject NE Hub Project to any r egulation 
       whatsoever, must also fail on jurisdictional grounds. 
       Such an attack constitutes a challenge to the expr ess 
       provisions of the 7(c) certificate issued by FERC to NE 
       Hub, which clearly contemplate and even direct NE 
       Hub's compliance with state regulation. As pointed out 
       by Defendants CNGT and Penn Fuel in their motions to 
       dismiss, the Court lacks jurisdiction over such a 
       challenge to the 7(c) certificate, as NE Hub failed to 
       apply to FERC for a rehearing of its April 29, 1998 
       Order issuing the 7(c) certificate. 
 
MemOp. at 18-19 (citations omitted). I agree with the 
Court's reasoning and outcome, but it would be helpful to 
elaborate further. FERC's 7(c) certificate required 
compliance with state and local regulations. Specifically, it 
stated that: 
 
       Any state or local permits issued with r espect to the 
       jurisdictional facilities authorized herein must be 
       consistent with the conditions of this certificate. The 
       Commission encourages cooperation between interstate 
       pipelines and local authorities. However, this does not 
       mean that state and local agencies, through 
       application of state or local laws, may prohibit or 
       unreasonably delay the construction or operation of 
       facilities by this Commission. 
 
J.A. at 109. The District Court interpreted this language to 
require that N.E. Hub obtain "any and all necessary state 
or local permits required to carry out the drilling and 
construction program." MemOp. at 5. In addition, the 7(c) 
certificate also contained a number of mor e specific 
provisions that required compliance with individual state 
regulations. See MemOp. at 14-15. 
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FERC's discretion in granting a 7(c) certificate is far- 
reaching. Section 717f(e) of the NGA pr ovides that, "[t]he 
Commission shall have the power to attach to the issuance 
of the certificate and to the exercise of the rights granted 
thereunder such reasonable terms and conditions as the 
public convenience and necessity may requir e." 15 U.S.C. 
S 717f(e). Under this authority, FERC r equired compliance 
with state and local regulations as long as they did not 
"prohibit or unreasonably delay the construction or 
operation of [the] facilities." J.A. at 109. FERC did not 
abdicate its jurisdiction; it exercised it. 
 
This interpretation is consistent with FERC's discussion 
of state regulations in Maritimes, 1997 WL 812154, at *8. 
In that case, FERC described its "requir ement" that 
applicants cooperate with state and local authorities as 
being something it had "imposed" as "a matter of policy." Id. 
A plain reading suggests that FERC was simply exercising 
its wide jurisdiction over the field, requiring applicants to 
comply with state and local regulations that impose 
additional, non-conflicting measures. W ere an actual 
conflict to arise, FERC noted that its decisions would 
control. 
 
FERC could have required, subsequent to its S 717f(e) 
authority, that applicants comply with conditions identical 
to those found in state regulations. It is unclear why, and 
indeed N.E. Hub has failed to argue that, r equiring 
compliance with state regulations that impose potentially 
non-conflicting conditions would be outside FERC's 
authority. Even if it were, as the District Court held, N.E. 
Hub's proper course would have been to challenge the 
validity of FERC's 7(c) certificate by seeking a r ehearing 
within thirty days of its issuance. See 15 U.S.C. S 717r(a). 
It failed to do so. N.E. Hub cannot now collaterally attack 
FERC's authority under S 717f(e) by challenging a state 
appellate process that FERC implicitly sanctioned. See City 
of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 335-36, 
78 S.Ct. 1209, 1218-19 (1958); Williams Natural Gas Co. v. 
City of Oklahoma City, 890 F.2d 255, 262 (10th Cir. 1989) 
("[A] challenger may not collaterally attack the validity of a 
prior FERC order in a subsequent proceeding . . . whether 
the collateral action is brought in state court or federal 
court."). 
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IV. 
 
I would affirm the District Court's decision based upon 
its disposition of the one legitimate claim at issue - N.E. 
Hub's argument that the state proceedings at issue are field 
preempted by FERC's 7(c) certificate. Field preemption does 
apply, but FERC exercised its wide-ranging authority to 
require compliance with state regulations. Because N.E. 
Hub failed to challenge FERC's authority dir ectly, it cannot 
now challenge the 7(c) certificate in this Court. The District 
Court properly held that it lacked jurisdiction over the 
claims at issue, and as a result, N.E. Hub's claims were 
properly dismissed. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                40 
 
